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The Challenge of Autonomy
• Verification & Certification of a 
Complex System
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• A Possible Solution – Run-Time 
Assurance (RTA)
Safety Systems Predict Escape Trajectories
Predict Future Threat State
Determine Need to Evade
& Threat Lethality
Evade
Notify
• Evasion Types
• Maneuvering Capability
• Evasion Trajectory Estimations
• Associated Uncertainties
• Scan/Track Pertinent Threat
• Simplify Threat Profile
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• Aircraft
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FAA/ASTM Collaboration
• ASTM Committee WK53403
• Develop a standard practice that safely bounds the 
flight behavior of autonomous UAS. 
• Originated from our collaboration with them 
regarding Auto GCAS and integrity management 
work on early autonomy concepts
• FAA has asked up to support the ASTM by sharing 
our techniques, practices and lessons learned as 
we develop EVAA
• Dec 16 Draft for Public Review
• Feb 17 Published
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• Avoidance Maneuvers
• Rate/Att. Capture
• Waypoint Following
• Altitude Capture
• Aircraft Lighting
Monitors
• Well Clear
• Well Clear/Sep. Assur.
• Rules of flight
• Airspace Boundaries
• Personal Space
• Privacy Rights
• Property
• Property Rights
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Controllers
• Avoidance Maneuvers
• Rate/Att. Capture
• Waypoint Following
• Altitude Capture
Monitors
• Collision Avoidance
• Ground
• Obstacle
• Air Traffic
• People & Property
• Weather Avoidance
• Person Avoidance
• Population Avoidance
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• Forced Landing
• Where to Land
• LoC Prevention
• LoC Recovery
Monitors
• LOC
• Power Plant
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Control Level
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• Pitch Autopilot
• Roll Autopilot
• Speed Autopilot
Monitors
• OLIV
• A/C State
• Dynamic Consistency
• Is this OLIV?
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Control Level
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• Stability & Control
• Structural Limiting
• Envelope Protection
Monitors
• Sensors
• Air Data
• Accelerometers
• Gyros
• Angle of Attack
• Sideslip
• FCS
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• Output Crosscheck
• Control Surfaces
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Phase 1 – All data base driven
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The Big Picture - Traveler
Trustworthy Autonomy
Certification
• Developing research findings to inform standards 
development for certifiable autonomy
• Collaborating with ASTM Working Group on 
autonomy certification guidelines
• FAA Collaboration and Interest
Expandable Variable-Autonomy Architecture 
(EVAA)
• Stretching the paradigm of autonomy
• Determinist Rulesets Bounding Autonomous Behavior
• Risk-Based Decision Making
• A process enabling certification
• Software Architecture/Framework
• Test Approach
• Scalable autonomy
• Pilot-in-the-Loop to “Fully Autonomous”
Low Altitude Small UAS Test Ranges (LASUTR)
• A tool for certification
• High-risk integrated research
Expandable Variable Autonomy Architecture
(EVAA)
• A Software Framework
• A Federated Architecture
• Safety Systems
• 1
• 2
• 3…
• Flight Executive
• Software Structure & Techniques
• Classical & Non-Classical 
Verification Methods
• Safety Evaluation of the Technology
• Targeted at Flight Demonstrations
• Social Interaction
Armstrong’s Traveler Effort
• Goal: Trustworthy Autonomy
• BVLOS to and from uncontrolled areas
• 400 feet to Surface
• Any Number of Aircraft per Operator
• NASA Funded Effort
• Leverages a 30 year development of autonomy from DoD & NASA
• TRL 3 to 5
• Local Armstrong Directed Objectives
• Supporting formulation of TACP Autonomous Systems start in 2018
• Primarily Software Approach and Process Development
• Platform ~Agnostic
• Mission ~Agnostic
• Sensor ~Agnostic
• Flight Development and Evaluation in Support of ASTM Regulatory 
Development
• Target Demos to Make an Airworthiness Case to
• Possible High-Visibility Demo in Spring of 2017
• Second Demo possible in 2018
LASUTR
How is LASUTR different from FAA Test Sites?
Agile/Flexible
• No COA allows for rapid changes based on 
evolving requirements
Interoperability
• Ability to test multiple aircraft/concept in an 
integrated manner
High-Risk Testing for New Concepts
• BVLOS
• Autonomy
• Night operations
• Controlled “risk” including controlled “crashes” 
without FAA accident notification requirements
• High-risk research conducted at LASUTR
• This generates research findings to help 
formulate testing requirements
• Research findings are shared with 
community of interest (FAA, Test Sites, 
industry, academia)
• FAA generates testing requirements for 
Test Sites (and other entities)
LASUTR and FAA Test Sites
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• Virtual Cliff
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• 4 mile loop
• Much longer at 
other LASUTR sites
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core autonomous system.
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flight test only components.
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EVAA Phase 2 Aircraft
• VTOL & Forward Flight Capable
• Payload Capacity for Sensors & EVAA
• EVAA Processors, Wiring & Interfaces
• 1 - oDroid XU4 0.16 lbs.
• 2 – Adrino Processors
• Speaker
• Lights 0.35 lbs.
• Sensors
• 4 - Stereo-Vision Camera Pairs and Processors
• ADS-B 0.07 lbs.
• UTM Wireless Interface
• Flight Test TSPI, etc. 0.57 lbs.
• 50 to 75 MPH Flight Speed
• 50 to 75 Mile Range
• Easy Break-Down & Assembly for Transportation to and from Test 
Sites
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Expandable Variable-Autonomy Architecture (EVAA)
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